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A UNIFORM RULE GOVERNING THE ADMISSION
AND PRACTICE OF ATTORNEYS BEFORE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Michael S. Ariens*
INTRODUCTION

In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,1 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire cannot require a bar
applicant to reside in New Hampshire before admitting the applicant to its
bar. Such a residence requirement violates the privileges and immunities
clause of the United States Constitution. 2 Implicit in the Piper decision is
the understanding that the practice of law and the role of the lawyer is
changing in scope. 3
Today, lawyers often practice in more than one state. Piper was not the
first Supreme Court decision to recognize this change in the lawyer's role.
In 1979, the Supreme Court noted "the high mobility of the bar." ' 4 Legal
commentators have also noted the increase in the interstate practice of law.'
Further, the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
recognized the increase in the interstate practice of law and determined that
the legal profession should avoid the implementation of unreasonable terri-

* Michael S. Ariens, B.A., St. Norbert College; J.D., Marquette University. Mr. Ariens
is an associate with the law firm of Holland & Knight in Washington, D.C.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
2. Id. at 1280-81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, states, in pertinent part, "The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
3. The lawyer is viewed as a protector of the "well-being of the Union" and is an important
actor in protecting the federal rights of litigants. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1277. See also H.R. REP.
No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1985) (urging federal courts to reexamine, among other
things, rules restricting admission to federal district courts to residents within the state in which
the court is located).
4. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979). The Second Circuit also used this phrase in
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966), to determine that a New York client must pay the fee of an antitrust lawyer licensed
in California who counseled a client in New York. The court thus rejected a defense of the
unauthorized practice of law.
5. See Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699,
700 (1975); Note, Certification of Out-of-State Attorneys Before the Federal District Courts:
A Plea for National Standards, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1967); Note, Attorneys:
Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1711-12 (1967). These commentators
suggested that the mobility of our society, the nationalization of the economy and business,
the increase in litigation concerning federal constitutional rights, and the concomitant specialization of the practice of law are factors that contribute to the 'mobility of the bar.
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torial limitations on the practice of law. 6 Finally, surveys conducted by
national legal publications in 1985 found that 181 of the 250 largest law
firms maintained offices in more than one state, 7 and 271 of the 499 largest
law firms maintained interstate offices.' In contrast, a 1978 survey found
that sixty-five of the one hundred largest law firms,9 and only twenty-seven
of the next one hundred largest law firms, 0 maintained law offices in more
than one state. The surveys exemplify the rapid growth recently experienced
in the interstate practice of law.
The increase in the interstate and international practice of law, particularly
in relation to litigation, necessitates a review of the rules governing the
admission of attorneys to practice before federal district courts. By virtue'
of the sweep of their jurisdictional net, federal district courts are likely to
be the fora for litigating most interstate or international disputes." The
present rules, based upon the antiquated notion that lawyers only rarely
practice law in federal district court, and then only in the federal district
court located in the state where the lawyer is admitted to practice, do not
address this change in the practice of law.
This Article proposes a Rule concerning the admission to practice law in
federal district courts and is designed to account for the recent changes in
the practice of law. The Rule is based on the theory that lawyers will act
ethically by handling only those legal matters within their competence and

6. [T]he demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct
problems in the regulation of the practice of law by the states. In furtherance of
the public interest, the legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal
affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a
lawyer of his choice in all matters including the presentation of a contested matter
in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently admitted to practice.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-9 (1970).

7. NAT'L L.J., September 30, 1985 (Special Insert); LEGAL TIMES, September 16, 1985, at
15-51. These results do not include firms that opened only foreign branches. A 1984 survey
found that 178 of the 250 largest law firms maintained offices in more than one state. NAT'L
L.J., September 24, 1984 (Special Insert).
8. LEOAL TIMES, supra note 7, at 15-51. In its 1984 survey, LEGAL TIMES found that 269
of the 500 largest law firms maintained offices in more than one state. LEGAL TIMES, September
16, 1984 (Special Section).
9. NAT'L L.J., September 18, 1978, at 14-17.
10. NAT'L L.J., September 25, 1978, at 14-17.
II. The Constitution defines the jurisdiction of federal courts in article III, which states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty, and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to controversies
between two or more states; between a State and Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
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that clients (consumers) will act intelligently when hiring a lawyer. The
proposed Rule will not result in a system of perfect client representation by
lawyers in federal district courts, but will provide the federal district courts
with some assurance of lawyer competence.
This Article first sets forth the various and chaotic rules concerning
admission of lawyers to practice law before federal district courts. Second,
is
an examination and criticism of previous federal bar admission proposals
2
given. Finally, this Article explains the basis for the proposed Rule.'

I.

PRESENT STATUS OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

A.

General Admission to Practice

Congress delegated to the courts the authority to regulate the admission
of lawyers to practice before federal courts. 3 The Supreme Court exercised
its statutory authority by instituting Supreme Court Rule 5.14 The United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals, through 'Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 46,'1 adopted a uniform rule of admission to practice before

12. This Article does not question the long-standing right and duty of the states to license
and regulate the practice of law within their jurisdictions. The proposed Rule attempts only to
standardize and nationalize the admission to practice law before United States District Courts.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1984) states:
Appearancepersonally or by counsel.
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1984) states:
Rule-making power generally.
The Supreme Court and all courts established by-Act of Congress may from time
to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme
Court.
See also In re Roberts, 682 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1982) (federal courts authorized to set criteria
for admission of attorneys through 28 U.S.C. § 2071 and FED. R. Cr. P. 83).
14. The section concerning eligibility to admission to practice generally before the Supreme
Court appears in Sup. CT. R. 5.1, which states:
It shall be requisite to the admission to practice in this Court that the applicant
shall have been admitted to practice in the highest court of a State, Territory,
District, Commonwealth, or Possession for the three years immediately preceding
the date of application, and that the applicant appears to the Court to be of good
moral and professional character.
15. FED. R. App. P. 46(a) states, in pertinent part:
An attorney who has been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the
United States, or the highest court of a state, or another United States court of
appeals, or a United States district court (including the district courts for the Canal
Zone, Guam and the Virgin Islands), and who is of good moral and professional
character, is eligible for admission to the bar of a court of appeals.
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its courts.' 6
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, lack a provision or rule
concerning the admission of lawyers to practice before United States District
Courts. Instead, pursuant to Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7

and to 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and § 2071,1" each district court has instituted local
rules that regulate and limit admission to practice before it. 9
The restrictiveness of the rules governing admission to the bar promulgated
by each district widely vary. The Eastern District of Wisconsin, for example,

states that, "Any licensed attorney in good standing before any United States
court, the highest court of any state, or the District of Columbia is eligible

for admission to practice in this Court.

' 20

In contrast, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia limits eligibility generally

16. While the procedure is uniform, a flaw of Rule 46(a) is that an attorney must apply to
become a member of each circuit court of appeals. As recently noted by the Supreme Court,
Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure does not regulate the admission and
discipline of attorneys to practice before federal district courts. In re Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 2874,
2880 n.3 (1985).
17. Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment,
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. A
local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date specified by the district court
and shall remain in effect unless amended by the district court or abrogated by the
judicial council of the circuit in which the district is located. Copies of rules and
amendments so made by any district court shall upon their promulgation be
furnished to the judicial council and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts and be made available to the public. In all cases not provided for by rule,
the district judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83. As recently amended, Rule 83 provides for public notice and the opportunity
to comment before promulgation of a new local rule by a federal district court.
A number of commentators question the widespread practice of implementing local rules
pursuant to Rule 83. See, e.g., Caballero, Is There an Over-Exercise of Local Rule-Making
Powers by the United States District Courts? 24 FED. B. NEws 325 (1977). But see Eash v.
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court stated:
The local rule device fulfills important informational purposes, placing the bar on
notice of a court's policies. Similarly, a local rule may well be the most effective
means of ensuring that all members of the bar are aware that a particular practice
is deemed improper, and thus subject to a sanction. Local rules may also alert
rulemakers to the need for changes in national rules and supply an empirical basis
for making such changes. Furthermore, a local rule may be a powerful implement
for rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity within a given
district.
Id.at 570 (citing Flanders, Local Rules inFederal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or
Information? 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213 (1981)).
18. See supra note 13.
19. The United States District Courts for the Western District of Wisconsin, Middle District
of Georgia and Eastern District of Kentucky have not published any local rules for admission
of attorneys to practice law.
20. E.D. Wis. R. 2, § 2.02.
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to practice before it to "[a]ny person who is a member in good standing of
the Supreme Court of Virginia ... if he is a resident of Virginia and
maintains an office to practice [in Virginia]." 2' Generally, most district court
rules concerning admission to practice law are more akin to the requirements
of the Eastern District of Virginia than to the requirements of the Eastern
District of Wisconsin. Specifically, however, the requirements for admission
22
vary greatly from one federal district to another.

21. E.D. VA. R. 7(B). These restrictions result in the incongruous situation where an attorney
who is a member in good standing of the Supreme Court of Virginia, but who is a resident of
the the District of Columbia, or whose office to practice law is located in the District of
Columbia, may practice before any court or agency of the Commonwealth of Virginia, but
may not practice before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
See In re Brown, 213 Va. 282, 191 S.E.2d 812 (1972) (if applicant takes bar exam, no requirement
to practice full-time in Virginia to become member of bar of Commonwealth). See also Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1280-81 (1985) ("New Hampshire's bar
residency requirement violates Art. IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution").
22. Fifty-nine district courts require an attorney to be admitted to practice before the highest
court of the state in which the district court is located and/or be a member in good standing
of the bar of that state. M.D. ALA. R. 1; N.D. ALA. R. 7(a)(1); D. ALASKA R. 3(A)(1); D.
ARIZ. R. 6; C.D. CAL. R. 2.2.1; E.D. CAL. R. 180(a); N.D. CAL. R. 110(1); S.D. CAL. R. 1103(a); D. COLO. R. 300; D. DEL. TITLE VIII, R. 8.1; S.D. FLA. R. 1; N.D. FLA. R. 4(A)(1);
M.D. FLA. R. 2.01(b); N.D. GA. R. l10-1(a); S.D. GA. § IV, R. 2; D. HAWAII R. I10-1(a);
D.
IDAHO R. 2-101; N.D. ILL. R. 3.00 A; N.D. IOWA R. 1.5.2; S.D. IOWA R. 1(a); D. KAN. R.
4(b); W.D. Ky. R. 2(b); E.D. LA. R. 21.2; M.D. LA. R. IB; W.D. LA. R. 2(b); D. MD. R. 2
IV A 3; D. MAss. R. 5(a)(1); W.D. MicH. R. 13; D. MINN. R. 1B; N.D. Miss. R. 1(2)(1); S.D.
Miss. R. 1(2)(1); W.D. Mo. R. 1B; E.D. Mo. R. 2(A); D. NEV. R. 4(b); D.N.H. R. 4(a);
D.N.J. R. 4B; D.N.M. R. 3(b); W.D.N.Y. R. 3A; M.D.N.C. R. 103(b); W.D.N.C. R. IA;
E.D.N.C. R. 2.02; S.D. OHIo R. 2.5.2; S. OR. R. 110-1; E.D. PA. R. 11(a); W.D. PA. R. 1(b);
D.P.R. R. 201.1; D.R.I. R. 4(b); D.S.D. R. 2, § 2; E.D. TENN. R. l(a); M.D. TENN. R. 1(b);
S.D. TEX. R. IB; D. UTAH R. l(b); E.D. VA. R. 7(B); W.D. VA. R. 1; E.D. WASH. R. l(a);
W.D. WASH. R. GR 2(b); N.D.W. VA. R. 1.04(b); S.D.W. VA. R. 1.05(b); D. Wyo. R. 10
3(a).
If the particular state has a unitary bar, meeting both requirements is not a problem. Some
states do not require a licensed member to join the state bar. The district courts that require
admission to practice before the highest court of a state and membership in good standing of
the bar of that state effectively prevent the admission of some attorneys to practice. This is
merely one example of a rule without a reason.
Federal district courts in Arkansas and the Eastern District of Tennessee require an applicant
to be admitted either to the bar of the state of the applicant's residence, or to a United States
District Court located in the state of the applicant's residence, or both. E.D. & W.D. ARK. R.
2(b)(2); W.D. TENN. R. 1(a).
The federal district court for Vermont requires an applicant to be a member of the bar of
the state of Vermont or a member of the bar of a federal district court within the First or
Second Circuit Courts of Appeals. D. VT. R. 1.A.I. See also N.D.N.Y. R. 2A as amended
(effective June, 1985).
Ten district courts require an applicant to be a member of any state bar or a United States
court. D.D.C. R. 104(b); N.D. IND. R. l(b); S.D. IND. R. 1(b); E.D. MicH. R. 12b; N.D.
OHIO R. 2.02; N.D. OKLA. R. 4(c); W.D. OKLA. R. 4(c); E.D. OKLA. R. 4(C); W.D. TEX. R.
200-1(a); E.D. TEX. R. 2(a).
Six district courts require an applicant to be a member of the bar of the state in which it is
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The balkanization of the admissions process is the result of an antiquated
view of the practice of law in federal district courts. This view assumes that
the vast majority of lawyers who practice law before a federal district court
will be members of the bar of the state in which the district court is located
and will reside and litigate in that state. This view unnecessarily, and perhaps
unconstitutionally,23 limits and restricts the practice of law in federal district

located or of a United States court. D. CONN. R. 2(a); D. ME. R. 3(b); D. MONT. R. 110-1(a);
E.D. PA. R. 11(a); M.D. PA.. R. 201.1; D.S.C. IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY ADMISSION AND
DISCIPLINE.

Finally, nine district courts require an applicant to be a member of any state bar. S.D. ALA.
R. IB; C.D. ILL. R. 1(a); S.D. ILL. R. 1; D. NEB. R. 5C; W.D.N.Y. R. 3F; N.D.N.Y. R. 2A;
D. N. D. R. 2(b); N.D. TEX. R. 13.1(a); E.D. WIs. R. 2, § 2.02.
In addition to these requirements, twelve courts require the applicant to have an office in
the state in which the court is located. D. HAWAII R. l10-1(b)2; D. KAN. R. 4(b); see W.D.
Ky. R. 2(a); M.D. LA. R. IB; E.D. Mo. R. 2(A); E.D.N.C. R. 2.02; E.D. PA. R. 11(a); M.D.
PA. R. 201.1; D.R.I. R. 4(b)(l); E.D. VA. R. 7(B); W.D. VA. R. 1. See also D.D.C. R. 104(a)
& (b) (to be resident counsel, attorney must have an office in the District of Columbia or
Maryland).
Thirteen district courts require residence in the state or district. M.D. ALA. R. 1(a); D.
HAWAII R. 110-1(b)2; D. IDAHO R. 2-101; D. KAN. R. 4(b); M.D. LA. R. IB; E.D. Mo. R.
2(A); D. NEV. R. 4(b); D.N.M. R. 3b; M.D.N.C. R. 103(b); D.N.D. R. 2(b); W.D. PA. R.
1(b); E.D. VA. R. 7(B); N.D. W. VA. R. 1.04(b); see D. Wyo. R. 103(b).
Ten other courts require either an office or residence in the state or district. N.D. ALA. R.
7(a)(1); D. COLO. R. 300; S.D. ILL. R. 1; E.D. LA. R. 21.2; D. ME. R. 3(b); S.D. OHIO R.
2.5.2; D.S.D. R. 2, § 2; S.D. TEx. R. IB; D. UTAH R. 1(b).
Two courts require that the applicant maintain -an "active" practice within the state or
district. M.D. LA. R. 1B; D.R.I. R. 4(b)(l).
Other district courts have further restrictions on general admission to practice law. See, e.g.,
S.D. FLA. R. I of the Special Rules Governing the Admission and Practice of Attorneys
(applicant must pass an examination concerning the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the law of federal jurisdiction and venue, and the
court's local rules). See also W.D. TEx. R. 200-1(a) (requiring previous one-year membership
in any United States District Court or in the highest court of any state).
23. There is no reported decision that declares unconstitutional any United States district
court local rule concerning admission to practice before a district court. However, several other
court decisions have held such rules constitutional. Frazier v. Heebe, 788 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475); see In re Roberts, 682 F.2d
105 (3d Cir. 1982); Brown v. McGarr, 583 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. IIl. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 777
(7th Cir. 1985); Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Colo. 1983).
Local federal bar admission rules that require an attorney's residence in or license from the
state in which the district court is located are inconsistent with Piper. But see Frazier v. Heebe,
788 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86475) (Eastern District of Louisiana local rule barring attorneys who neither reside nor maintain
an office in Louisiana not invalidated by Piper since privileges and immunities clause not
applicable to federal government and its officers). Other limitations to admission that discriminate against certain lawyers, including an office requirement, an active practice requirement
or a waiting-period requirement, may also be unconstitutional. The limitations are not rationally
related to the applicant's fitness to practice law. Also, these rules may unconstitutionally infringe
the client's right to choice of counsel. See Note, Recent Developments-ConstitutionalRight
to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L. REv. 856 (1967). But see In re United States
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courts. A review of current legal practice exemplifies the severity of these
restrictions. Civil rights lawyers litigate cases in a number of courts in the
United States. Some personal injury and criminal defense attorneys also
practice in federal courts across the United States. Many corporations use
the same counsel wherever they sue or are sued.
States have legitimate interests in regulating the admission of lawyers to
practice within their respective jurisdictions. By requiring a prospective lawyer
to show competence in the practice of law, a state protects its public. One
state interest is to license only those lawyers who demonstrate competence
by showing a familiarity with local law. This requirement is important, even
with the proliferation of uniform acts. 24 A second state interest is to inform
those who seek representation by, or counselling from, lawyers licensed by
the state that such lawyers are prima facie capable of serving the public's
needs. Third, regulating the ethical practice of law by lawyers either licensed
by it, or located within the state's borders, is a legitimate and important
state interest. Fourth, the state is interested in maintaining the ethical administration of justice in its courts, which concomitantly permits it to discipline
its lawyers for unethical or illegal conduct. A final purported state interest
2
is the economic protection of its lawyer-residents.
The interest of federal district courts in regard to the admission and
practice of lawyers is quite different. Federal district courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and exercise their authority only after the institution of
a lawsuit. Federal courts are enabled by statute to decide, among other
disputes, cases against foreign states, 26 civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, 27 and civil actions where there
28
is a complete diversity of citizenship between the parties.
This limited authority, therefore, places different duties upon a federal
court than those duties placed upon a state. For example, the requirement
of a license by a state is an attempt by the state to inform prospective
consumers that the lawyer has some degree of competence to handle legal

v. Panzardi-Alvarez, 623 F. Supp. 108 (D.P.R. 1986) (rule permitting non-resident attorney to
appear pro hac vice only once yearly does not contravene any right granted by either statute

or Constitution, including sixth amendment); In re Admission Pro Hac Vice of Chokwe
Lumumba, 526 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). Cf. Sheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods.
Corp., 367 F. Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("inconvenience caused plaintiff due to the need
to retain local counsel in the transferred district is of little if any weight on a motion to
transfer").
24. See UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (West Master ed. 1976).
25. Cf. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279 n.18 (protecting lawyers from competition not a 'substantial
reason,' since privileges and immunities clause designed primarily to prevent economic protectionism) (citing Smith, Time for a National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 557 (1978)).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1984).
27. Id. § 1331.

28. Id. § 1332(a).
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problems. 29 The license also informs prospective consumers that the lawyer

has a specific knowledge of local law. On the other hand, federal district
courts do not have a legitimate interest in helping consumers select attorneys
who have made a minimum showing of competence. 0 The parties in federal
court have already completed their search and have hired counsel versed and
knowledgeable in the applicable law upon the institution of the lawsuit.
Another example of the difference between the interests of the states and
the federal district courts is that a state protects consumers of legal services
from the unethical "office" practice of law. Office practice includes the
drafting of wills, assisting in real estate transactions or handling client funds.
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting local consumers of such
services from unethical office practice. Federal courts, however, are accountable to the claims of a much narrower public. The federal courts are primarily
concerned with fulfilling their duty to balance the rights and duties of the
specific litigants involved in any case properly before the court. 3' Thus, the

first three state interests set forth above are satisfied without regard to any
federal district court bar admission rules.
Federal district courts do, however, have a legitimate interest in insuring
the competent practice of law by attorneys appearing before them. Federal
courts presume that lawyers will act competently. This presumption of
competence and ethical practice in federal court is implied in Rule 3 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.12 Federal

29. Some states further certify that lawyers are specialists in particular fields of law. See,
e.g., Florida Bylaws Under the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, art. 19, app. I, § 2
(West Supp. 1986) (detailing requirements to become certified civil trial lawyer). Florida
recognizes other certified specialties, such as a tax lawyer, and marital and family lawyer. Id.
at apps. II & 111.
30. The sixth amendment guarantees indigent criminal defendants competent counsel, so
their lack of choice in counsel does not legitinlate any additional court interests. Federal district
courts have the discretionary authority to request counsel to represent in forma pauperis litigants
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1984), which some courts have construed as authority to appoint
counsel. See McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1982) and cases cited therein.
The use of this statute to authorize the appointment of counsel has been criticized by Judge
Richard Posner, who argues that an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim will be able to
obtain retained counsel. Id. at 1323-25. See also Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769-71 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting) (same).
The use of §1915(d) does not, however, alter the interest of the federal courts in insuring
the ethical administration of justice. The Rule proposed in this Article may result in a greater
assurance that appointed counsel is competent.
31. The federal court may be concerned secondarily in interpreting federal laws and accompanying administrative regulations, while balancing the rights and duties of all citizens or
residents of the United States.
32.
R.P. J.P.M.D.L. 3. Admission to Practice Before the Panel and Representation
in Transferred Actions.
Every member in good standing of the Bar of any district court of the United States
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courts do not assume that lawyers not admitted to practice in those courts
are incompetent, since most courts routinely permit lawyers to litigate a
particular case in federal court.3 3 If incompetence is later found to exist, the
court can take appropriate disciplinary action.14 Federal courts must trust
litigants to choose competent counsel. A federal court should give any party
before it a great deal of leeway in being represented by counsel of the party's
choice. This should be the case even when the matter before the courts is

due solely to diversity of citizenship.35
The asserted state interest of protecting the lawyer-resident's economic
interests cannot be a valid policy of federal district courts.3 6 Federal district
courts were created by an act of Congress. A special interest in protecting
only some citizens of the United States is both indefensible and unconstitutional .7
Federal district courts are solely concerned with litigation. The courts are
not regulators of lawyer counselling. The mandate of the federal courts is
to ensure the ethical administration of justice and to discipline attorneys
appearing before it for any unethical or illegal conduct.

is entitled without condition to practice before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation. Any attorney of record in any action transferred under Section 1407
may continue to represent his client in any district court of the United States to
which such action is transferred. Parties to any action transferred under Section
1407 are not required to obtain local counsel in the district to which such action is
transferred.
This Rule implicitly acknowledges the uniformity of the federal rules of procedure and
evidence. Further, this rule eliminates the argument that the variety and breadth of local rules
require the use of local or resident counsel.
33. In fact, admission to practice in federal courts historically has been based on the prima
facie showing of competence of admission to a state bar. See Theard v. United States, 354
U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
34. See In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1977).
35. Although the decision of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), necessitates the
application of state substantive law in diversity jurisdiction cases, this is not an argument
against a uniform, national rule. First, lawyers may handle only those legal matters specifically
within their competence. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(l) (1970);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1:1 (1983). Second, clients should be permitted
to choose non-resident counsel to represent them in federal court without undue interference.
Third, bifurcation of the bar on this ground would be an administrative nightmare. Fourth,
diversity jurisdiction was created by Congress and may be eliminated by Congress. Finally, a
state's conflicts of law rule can often result in a state court applying the substantive law of
another state to decide a particular case.
36. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); Brakel & Loh, supra note
5, at 702. See also supra note 25. Additionally, the commerce clause was designed to prevent
states from erecting barriers to protect its residents from economic competition. See, e.g.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
37. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:649

B. Pro Hac Vice Admission
Almost all district courts provide for the admission of attorneys to practice
pro hac vice.3 Admission is discretionary with the court, 39 and most courts
require an attorney admitted pro hac vice to be associated with resident or

local counsel.40 However, the use of pro hac vice admission is not a panacea
to restrictive rules governing general admission to practice law. It protects
neither the court's interest in some assurance of lawyer competence nor the
client's interest in hiring counsel of its choice. The additional requirement
of local counsel is simply economic protectionism. Fees paid to local counsel
are an unnecessary litigation expense. The client rarely chooses the local
counsel. Therefore, the local counsel's advice, if ever sought, is usually given
a corresponding weight.
The local counsel requirement may also create conflicts in the attorneyclient relationship. Associated counsel may offer conflicting legal advice to
the client, and, therefore, the client may become the arbiter of local and

38. Pro hac vice is defined as, "For this turn; for this one particular occasion. A lawyer
may be admitted to practice in a jurisdiction for a particular case only." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1091 (5th ed. 1979). A review of state and federal pro hac vice rules is found in
E. MICHELMAN, PRO HAC VICE REGULATION-IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST? (ABA Monograph
1984).
The district courts that allow admission pro hac vice are M.D. ALA. R. Ib; N.D. ALA. R.
7(c); S.D. ALA. R. 2A; D. ALASKA R. 3(c)(l); D. ARIz. R. 6(b); E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 2(d);

C.D.

CAL.

R. 2.2.3.1; E.D.

CAL.

R. 180(b)(2); N.D.

CAL.

R. 110-2(b); S.D.

CAL.

R. 110-3(e);

D. COLO. R. 301A; D. CONN. R. 2(d); D. DEL. R. 8.1 C & D; D.D.C. R. 104(b); S.D. FLA.
R. 4F OF THE SPECIAL RULES GOVERNING THE ADMISSION AND PRACTICE OF ATTORNEYS; N.D.
FLA. R. 4(D)(1). M.D. FLA. R. 2.02(a); N.D. GA. R. 110-2; S.D. GA. § IV, R. 4; D. HAWAII
R. 110-1(d); D. IDAHO R. 2-104; C.D. ILL. R. I(d); N.D. ILL. R. 3.12; S.D. ILL. R. 1(a); N.D.
IND. R. I(c); S.D. IND. R. 1(c); N.D. & S.D. IOWA R. 1.5.6; D. KAN. R. 4(f); W.D. KY. R.
2(c); E.D. LA. R. 21.5; M.D. LA. R. IEI; W.D. LA. R. 2(d); D. ME. R. 3(d)(1); D. MD. R.
IV, F of R. 3; D. MASS. R. 6(b); E.D. MICH. R. 12(d); W.D. MICH. R. 14; D. MINN. R. ID;
N.D. MIss. R. l(a)(4)(A); S.D. Miss. R. l(a)(4)(A); W.D. Mo. R. IE; E.D. Mo. R. 2D; D.
MONT. R. 110-2(c); D. NEB. R. 5E; D. NEV. R. 4(e)(l); D.N.H. R. 4(c); D.N.J. R. 4C; D.N.M.
R. 3d; S.D. & E.D.N.Y. R. 2(c); W.D.N.Y. R. 3H; N.D.N.Y. R. 3; M.D.N.C. R. 103(d)(1);
W.D.N.C. R.IB; E.D.N.C. R. 2.05; D.N.D. R. 2(d)(6); S.D. OHIO R. 3.0.4.; N.D. OHIO R.
2.08; N.D. OKLA. R. 4(f); W.D. OKLA. R. 4(F); E.D. OKLA. R. 4(f); D. OR. R. 110-2(b); E.D.
PA. R. 13(a); M.D. PA. R. 202.3; W.D. PA. R. 1(e); D.P.R. R. 204.2; D.R.I. R. 5(c); D.S.C.
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINE; D.S.D. R. 2, § 5; E.D. TENN. R.
1(g); M.D. TENN. R. I(d); W.D. TENN. R. l(b); S.D. TEX. R. IE; N.D. TEX. R. 13.3; E.D.
TEX. R. 2(d); D. UTAH R. 1(c); D. VT. R. l.B.I; E.D. VA. R. 7(D); W.D. VA. R. 3; E.D.
WASH.

R. 1(c); W.D.

WASH.

R. GR 2(d); N.D. W.

VA.

R. 1.04(c); S.D. W.

VA.

R. 1.05(c);

D. WYo. R. 103(b).
39. W.D. KY. R. 2(c) (permission to act as attorney for party pro hac vice may be withdrawn
at any time); W.D.N.C. R. IB (special admission is exception, not rule); S.D. OHIo R. 3.0.4
(permission may be withdrawn at any time).
40. Only fourteen courts that permit pro hac vice appearance also permit a waiver of the
local counsel requirement. FED. LOCAL CT. R. E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 2(d); N.D. FLA. R.
4(D)(2); M.D. FLA. R. 2.02(a)(1); E.D. LA. R. 21.6; W.D. Mo. R. IF; D. NEB. R. 5E; D.
NEV. R. 4(e)(4); W.D.N.C. R. IB; W.D. TENN. R. 1(b); W.D. TEX. R. 200-3; N.D. TEX. R.
13.4; N.D. W. VA. R. 1.04(c); S.D. W. VA. R. 1.05(c).
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outside counsel's differences. Moreover, the rules of several district courts
require that local counsel be prepared to try the case alone. 41 This requirement
42
abrogates the client's choice of counsel.
43
The uniformity of federal procedure vitiates any need for local counsel.
Local counsel is not necessary to receive papers or service of process. Any
designated agent will suffice." Further, local counsel is not necessary for
unscheduled hearings. As noted by the majority in Piper, "In many situations, unscheduled hearings may pose only a minimal problem for the nonresident lawyer. Conference telephone calls are being used increasingly as an
expeditious means of dispatching pretrial matters." 45 In some instances, local
counsel may be located a greater distance from the courthouse than outside
counsel." Moreover, local counsel is unnecessary for a court to exercise
disciplinary control. Any attorney who practices before a federal district
court is subject to its disciplinary sanctions. 47 Finally, local counsel may be
4
unavailable to prosecute or defend certain kinds of cases. 1

II.

PRIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

A.

BAR

ADMISSION PROPOSALS

An Overview

Committees organized to discuss the efficacy of a uniform rule to practice
before United States District Courts have met sporadically since 1938.49 As
41. See E.D. LA. R, 21.5; S.D. Oiuo R. 3.0.1.
42. But see In re Admission Pro Hac Vice of Chokwe Lumumba, 526 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (counsel both competent and voluntarily chosen did not alter court's decision to refuse
to admit counsel to practice pro hac vice).
43. See supra note 32. Even "informal" local rules or standing orders, such as requesting
permission from the judge before approaching the witness, can be learned from the court clerk.
The clerk likely knows these rules as well as any local counsel.
44. See C.D. ILL. R. 1(e). But see Ma v. Community Bank, 686 F.2d 459, 471 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (local rule concerning court's discretion to require litigant to
utilize local counsel is designed to facilitate mechanical service, not to deprive plaintiff of right
to select attorney).
45. 105 S. Ct. at 1280 n.21 (citing Hanson, Olson, Shuart & Thornton, Telephone Hearings
in Civil Trial Courts: What Do Attorneys Think? 66 JUDICATURE 408, 408-09 (1983)).
46. See Fidelity Bank v. Commonwealth Marine & Gen. Assur. Co. Ltd., 581 F. Supp.
999, 1003 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (local counsel requirement of Pennsylvania waived since counsel
maintained office in Wilmington, Delaware, much closer to courthouse than most of Pennsylvania). But see Frazier v. Heebe, 788 F.2d 1049, 1054 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475) (Frazier, member of bar of Louisiana whose office and
residence were in Mississippi, denied admission to bar of Eastern District of Louisiana in part
because of distance from court, although court admitted that others were admitted to that bar
because they were residing or working in Louisiana despite greater distance than Frazier from
court).
47. The uniform, national Rule advocated in this Article would likely result in even greater
disciplinary control over unethical lawyers, since suspension or disbarment from the bar would
prohibit the lawyer from practicing in any federal district court.
48. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 1964) (if no local counsel
available, court rule requiring local counsel should be waived).
49. Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior Court Judges, 24 A.B.A. J. 905 (1938).
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recently as September, 1985, a report proposing uniform federal bar admission requirements was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United
States."o
The history of the proposals for admission to practice before the federal
district court has been thoroughly canvassed." In 194052 and 1947,13 committees advised the Judicial Conference of the United States that "varying
conditions that exist in the different districts" militate against the implementation of a uniform rule concerning admission to practice.14 In 1973, the
Judicial Conference affirmed its opposition to "any uniform rule for admission to the bar of the courts of the United States," 55 even though the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association had adopted a resolution that urged a uniform rule the previous year.5 6 As recently as 1985, a
committee urged the Judicial Conference to reaffirm its opposition to a
national federal district court bar admission rule."
B.
1.

Other Proposals

Clare Committee Proposal

In 1974, Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, on behalf of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit, appointed

50. The Judicial Conference Implementation Committee on Admission of Attorneys to
Federal Practice [hereinafter cited as the King Committee Report] recommended that the
proposals for federal bar admission reported in the Final Report of the Committee to Consider
Standards for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts, September 19, 20, 1979, 83 F.R.D.
215 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Devitt Committee Report) be adopted. See also Tentative
Recommendations, 79 F.R.D. 187 (1978). The Judicial Conference adopted the recommendations
of the King Committee at its September, 1985 meeting. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying
text.
51. Agata, Admissions and Discipline of Attorneys in FederalDistrict Courts: A Study and
ProposedRules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 258-66 (1975).
52. Committee on Local District Rules, 1938-1940.
53. Judicial Conference Committee to Consider the Advisability of Regulating Admission
to the Bar of the Federal Courts by Uniform Rules, 1944-47.
54. Report of Committee on Local District Rules, at 1. For an early plea for uniform
requirements, see Crotty, Uniform Requirements for Admission to Practice in the Federal

Courts, 17 B. EXAMINER 35 (1948).
55. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at 43-44
(April 5-6, 1973).
56. "Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the promulgation by the
Judicial Conference of the United States of a uniform system for admission of attorneys to
the federal courts and agencies and that disciplinary control of the practice of attorneys in
federal courts and agencies be administered by an appropriate agency as a function of the
federal judiciary." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
MIDYEAR MEETING at 26 (1972).
See also Agata, supra note 51, at 263-64, in which the author noted that a 1972 survey of
federal district court judges found wide support for a uniform admission to practice rule.
57. King Committee Report, supra note 50, at 24.
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a committee to make "recommendations for amendments in the rules of
admission to the federal courts." 58 The committee, popularly known as the
Clare Committee, concluded that the quality of trial advocacy needed improvement.5 9 The Clare Committee's solution provided that the federal district courts within the Second Circuit should require a bar admission applicant
either to have assisted in the preparation or to have attended the hearing of
four proceedings on the merits, including two federal court proceedings. An
alternative solution suggested by the committee required the applicant to
have observed six complete hearings on the merits, at least three before a
federal court. 60
The requirements of the Clare Committee proposal go both too far and
not far enough. The "assisting" requirement necessitates that the applicant
aid an attorney already admitted to the bar of the federal district court. The
opportunity to assist before two federal court proceedings may not be
available to a sole practitioner or small firm lawyer, and may not be
affordable to the client or to the lawyer. Moreover, the "assisting" requirement resembles a local counsel requirement, which, as discussed above, 61 is
unnecessary and may be harmful to the attorney-client relationship.
The alternative "observing" requirement serves to familiarize the lawyer
with local customs, but fails to provide any indicia of competence. Many
reporters and courtroom regulars can fulfill the "observing" requirement
without becoming competent advocates. Likewise, many lawyers need not
observe testimonial proceedings to adequately represent a client.
The Clare Committee proposal also limited admission to practice to those
attorneys either already a member of the bar of the state in which the district
court is located or to those admitted to a federal district court located in a

58. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice,
67 F.R.D. 159, 161 (1975) [hereinafter cited as the Clare Committee Report].
59. Id. at 182. One federal district court judge sitting in the Eastern District of New York
took issue with that conclusion. Weinstein, An Argument Against Federal Admission Rules
(Part I), 172 N.Y.L.J. 108 (1974). In his dissent to the King Committee Report, Judge
Higginbotham also disputed this general conclusion made by the Clare Committee. King
Committee Report, supra note 50, at 41-46 (Higginbotham, J.,dissenting). Judge Higginbotham
noted that a survey of federal district court judges revealed that only nine percent of attorneys
were deemed to have performed either "not quite adequate" or worse, while ninety-one percent
of attorneys were deemed to have performed adequately or better. Id. at 43-44 (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting). The majority of the King Committee admitted that it lacks "empirically
demonstrable evidence" concerning the existence of lawyer incompetence, id. at 90-91, and
further concluded that gathering evidence was beyond its mandate. Id. at 83. See also Frankel,
Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHToN L. REv. 613, 622 (1977)
("If anybody needs an example of a 'finding' unsupported by competent evidence, the quoted
one will do"); Pedrick & Frank, Trial Incompetence: Questioningthe Clare Cure, TRIAL, March,
1976, at 47, 52 & 54 ("We begin with a 'deficiency' which is shaky at best. We leap to a cure
without a scintilla of evidence [of trial incompetency] ....").
60. Clare Committee Report, 67 F.R.D. 159, 188 (1975) (app. M).
61. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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state where the lawyers are admitted and maintain offices, provided that
that district court reciprocates admission. 2 These requirements fail to nationalize admission to practice, and, indeed, the reciprocity requirement63
erects a barrier that can only be described as an economic-protection measure.
Federal district courts should not protect lawyers from the economics of
competition.
Finally, the Clare Committee decided not to require the applicants to
demonstrate their knowledge of federal rules of procedure and jurisdiction
by way of examination. The Committee proposal merely required course
study of the law of evidence, civil and criminal procedure, professional
responsibility, and trial advocacy. These course requirements inadequately
assure the court of a lawyer's familiarity with the federal rules of procedure
or evidence, and thus any level of lawyer competence. These reasons illustrate
that the Clare Committee recommendations failed to adequately address the
question of federal district court admission to practice.6
2. The Devitt Committee Recommendations
The most recent proposal concerning standards for admission to practice
in federal courts was issued in September, 1979, by the Devitt Committee. 6
As a minimum standard of each federal district court, the Devitt Committee
recommended that an applicant be required:
1) to pass an examination concerning the subjects of Federal Rules of
Criminal, Civil and Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
federal jurisdiction and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2) as a condition of trying cases, a requirement of four trial experiences,
including two actual trials."6

The Judicial Conference of the United States adopted the Devitt Committee
report on September 20, 1979. Several district courts, by local rule, have
adopted either one or both of these recommendations. 67 The King Committee,

62. Clare Committee Report, 67 F.R.D. 159, 187 (1975) (app. M).
63. See, e.g., Brakel & Loh, supra note 5, at 704 ("Reciprocity requirements, for example,
imply a disregard of legitimate concerns and instead are explicable solely in terms of economic
protectionism"). Cf. Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 862 (Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 85-528) (limiting reciprocity to those lawyers
who intend to practice full-time in Virginia not a violation of the commerce clause).
64. Compare Pedrick & Frank, supra note 59, at 47 with McLaughlin, Trial Incompetence:
In Defense of the Clare Cure, TRIAL, June, 1976, at 62.
65. 83 F.R.D. 215 (1979).
66. Id. at 222 & 224.
67. N.D. FLA. R. 4(A)(1) (both requirements); S.D. FLA. R. 1 of the Special Rules Governing
the Admission and Practice of Attorneys (both requirements); N.D. ILL. R. 3.10B (trial
experience); S.D. IowA R. 1(a) (examination); D. MD. R. II, B & C, 2 (trial experience); D.
MASS. R. 5 (examination); D.P.R. R. 201.2 (examination); D.R.I. R. 4(b)(2) (examination).
Other courts adopted other Devitt Committee recommendations, such as peer review and student
practice. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 110-10 (peer review) & 110-11 (student practice).
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instituted by the Judicial Conference to oversee and assess pilot district court
programs, adopted at least some of the Devitt Committee recommendations.
The King Committee also concluded that each federal district court should

adopt the examination and trial experience requirements. 68 The Judicial
Conference adopted the King Committee report in September, 1985.69
The Devitt Committee proposal and the King Committee report are flawed

in several respects. First, these bar admission standards are recommended
as minimum requirements to practice before each federal district court. Each
court, therefore, is free to establish additional standards before admitting a
lawyer to practice law. 70 The failure to nationalize admission requirements

is a major shortcoming.
This shortcoming is exacerbated by the King Committee's decision not to

recommend a national federal bar admission rule. The decision was based
on two dubious propositions. First, the King Committee was concerned that
the Judicial Conference would lack the legal authority to require federal

district courts to adopt such a rule. 71 Second, a national federal district court
bar admission rule would not improve the quality of advocacy, since the
rule would sacrifice programs designed to enhance advocacy skills above a
72

minimal level.
Neither reason is sensible, much less persuasive. A lack of legal authority
on the part of the Judicial Conference to implement a national admission
rule does not mean that no legal authority to implement a national rule
exists. Both Congress 73 and the Supreme Court 74 have such authority. The
Judicial Conference, if necessary, could request these bodies to implement
7
or enforce a national bar admission rule. 1

68. King Committee Report, supra note 50, at 10-15.
69. The Devitt Committee recommendations were disfavored by eighty-five percent of
attorneys polled in one survey. Spears, Federal Court Admission Standards-A 45 Year Sucess
Story, 83 F.R.D. 235, 236 n.6 (1979). See LEGAL TIMES, September 23, 1985, at 2, cols. 1-3;
NAT'L L.J., September 30, 1985, at 9, col. 1. Then Chief Justice Warren Burger endorsed the
King Committee report in his 1985 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, stating, "No valid reason
has been advanced suggesting why these minimum requirements should not be instituted." Id.
at 9.
70. 83 F.R.D. 215, 221 (1979). Other standards could, of course, include membership in
the bar of the state in which the district court is located, or having an office within the district.
71. King Committee Report, supra note 50, at 24.
72. Id.
73. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1978) states, in pertinent part, "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in
civil actions." See also id. § 2071 (1948) (granting the Supreme Court authority to require
inferior courts to prescribe rules consistent with rules prescribed by the Supreme Court).
75. Further, the authority cited by the King Committee in support of its first proposition
is inapposite. The Supreme Court, in In re Snyder, merely concluded that Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 46 does not provide for the admission or suspension of attorneys from
practice in federal district court. 105 S. Ct. 2874, 2880 n.3 (1985).
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The second reason given by the King Committee also completely misses
the mark. The implementation of a national rule would not sacrifice other
programs aimed at improving advocacy beyond minimal standards of competence. As noted earlier, some federal district courts currently ignore the
issue of a minimal level of lawyer competence. 76 A national rule would
provide these districts with some level of assurance of lawyer competence.
A national rule would not bar the Judicial Conference nor any other body
from implementing programs designed to improve the levels of competence.
The King Committee utterly failed to support the reasoning behind its
conclusions.
The second flaw in the Devitt and King Committees' reports is found in
the requirement of four trial experiences before permission to conduct a
trial. This requirement, a stricter one than that of the Clare Committee, 7 is
not a legitimate tool to determine competence as a trial advocate. 78 Three
reasons militate against this rule. First, clients who are litigating or who
wish to litigate in federal district court already have chosen lawyers whom
they trust and upon whom they rely. The prior-trial requirement unduly
interferes with that relationship. A prospective litigant may be forced to
choose between a known, competent, but ineligible counsel who is familiar
with the litigant or the problems of the case, and an admitted counsel whose
competence is not otherwise known to the litigant. Forcing a litigant to make
this choice serves neither the litigant nor the court's interest in assuring the
competence of counsel. If the client hires both ineligible general litigation
counsel and special trial counsel, fees will increase, and the client may be
given conflicting litigation advice. Conflicts of this type disserve the client
and may present ethical problems for counsel. 79
Second-chairing or observing a trial may help an attorney obtain experience
as a trial lawyer, but it does not make a competent advocate. 0 Competence
is not gained if the second-chair lawyer is merely another spectator or
observer. 8 ' Inferring competence simply from the fact that a lawyer has

76. See generally supra notes 20-48 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
78. This proposition is supported by the survey relied upon by the Devitt and King
Committees. The survey found that ninety-one percent of the attorneys were deemed to have
performed adequately or better at trial, while only nine percent were deemed to have performed
not quite adequately or worse. King Committee Report, supra note 50, at 43 (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting). The King Committee recommended the trial experience requirement, even though
it acknowledged that "the available data are insufficient to prove or disprove the effectiveness
of an experience requirement." Id. at 15.
79. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
80. Judge Higginbotham makes the point that an experience requirement, satisfied by secondchairing, easily would be met by new attorneys in major law firms, but would be difficult to
hurdle by those attorneys representing the poor. This situation could result in the exclusion of
a significant class of litigants to the federal courts. King Committee Report, supra note 50, at
61-62 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
81. Moreover, the knowledge acquired in previous state court trials may not be of any value
in conducting a trial in federal court.
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observed trials may violate the ethical rule that no lawyer is permitted to
represent a client in a legal matter "which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating himself with a lawyer

who is competent to handle

''

it. 82

83

The grandfather exception to the Devitt Committee proposal also poses
problems. The exception permits lawyers already admitted to a federal district
court to use their access to federal district court, rather than their expertise,
as their selling point. This makes these lawyers more attractive to prospective
clients. Moreover, this limits the fora available to litigants who hire the
competent but not technically qualified lawyer and also skews the market
4
for legal services.1
The third weakness of the King Committee's report is that the examination
includes testing on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The former is unnecessary to the admission
to practice law in federal district courts,85 and the latter is now tested by
most states as part of the bar examination in the Multistate Professional
86
Respofisibility Examination.
Finally, the Devitt Committee proposal separates the bar. The barristersolicitor distinction extant in Great Britain 7 has never taken hold in the
United States. The practice of law in the United States has not thereby
suffered. Implementing this distinction at this time is untenable and un-

82. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 6-1O1(A)(1) (1970);

MODEL RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1:1. See also Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279 (lawyers must be trusted
to maintain high ethical standards of conduct, and courts must presume ethical practice by
lawyers).
83. Attorneys already admitted to practice are exempted from satisfactory completion of
the Devitt Committee recommendations under the King Committee rule. Judge Higginbotham
argues that this would disproportionately exclude two groups which have recently increased
their numbers as a percentage of the lawyer population, women and minorities. King Committee
Report, supra note 50, at 65-71 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 60-61 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham also asserts that the
cost of legal services will increase if the experience requirement is implemented. Id. at 62-64
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). He noted that pilot districts have experienced significant decreases in membership. Id. at 52-54 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
85. See Spears, supra note 69, at 242 n.31 ("[Slince the examination is only for admission
before the Western District of Texas, applicants are not tested over the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure"); see also S.D. FLA. R. 1 (no testing of knowledge of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure).
86. 1985 INFORMATION BOOKLET, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS 3 (thirty states
require satisfactory score on the MPRE as part of obtaining bar admission). The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to replace the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
and are now in effect in a number of states, albeit with some modification. LEGAL TIMES,
August 12, 1985, at 1, cols. 1-5. Several states are considering whether to enact the Model
Rules.
87. See, e.g., LEGAL TIMES, December 23/30, 1985 at 1, cols. 4-6 (discussing two challenges
by English solicitors to the custom of permitting only English barristers to represent clients in
court).
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workable. The distinction shows a disrespect of the judgment and intelligence
of both lawyers and their clients.
3.

Wilkey Proposal

Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia proposed a "United States Bar" in an article
published in 1972.88 The strength of the proposal is that admission to all
federal district courts is provided upon admission to this newly created Bar.8 9
The drawbacks are that the proposal retains the local counsel requirement, 9°
and that all licensed attorneys are admitted to the Bar as of the date of the
Bar's creation. 9' Thus, only prospective lawyers are tested.92 The Wilkey
proposal's benefits outweigh its drawbacks, however, and it is used as a
model for the Rule proposed in this Article.
III.

THE PROPOSED RULE

The following Rule contains six interrelated sections. The most efficient
and understandable method of introducing the Rule is to present and explain
each section separately.
A.

Eligibility

A lawyer who is admitted to practice before the highest court of any state,
the District of Columbia or any United States Territorial possession, or
who is a licensed member in good standing of the bar of any state, the
District of Columbia or any United States Territorial possession, and who
has attained a successful score on the United States District Court Bar
Examination is eligible to become a member of the Bar of the United
States District Court.
This examination will test the applicant's knowledge of the Federal Rules
of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
law of federal jurisdiction and venue. The examination will consist of one
hundred multiple-choice questions. The Judicial Conference of the United
States will set a satisfactory score. Any person who has completed sixty
hours of study at an ABA-accredited law school and any graduate of an
unaccredited law school is eligible to take this examination. An applicant
may take this examination as often as it is offered. It shall be offered at
least two times every year. The examination fee is $50.00.
Eligibility to the Bar of the United States District Court is predicated on
two conditions: present admission to practice before the highest court of a

88. Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States Bar, " 58 A.B.A. J. 355 (1972).

89. Id.at 357.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 358.
92. Id. This test also failed to focus on federal procedural and evidentiary rules. The Federal

Rules of Evidence, however, were not implemented as of the date of the Wilkey proposal.
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state, the District of Columbia, or a territorial possession, or status as a
licensed member in good standing of a bar of a state, District of Columbia,
or territorial possession and a passing score in the District Court Bar

Examination.
The first requirement is written in the disjunctive in order to insure that
all lawyers practicing, or permitted to practice, in a given state fall within

the requirement. 93 Admission to the bar of a state is an indication of some
minimum level of competence, and practice has proven to be valuable in
assessing a minimum level of competence. Moreover, this requirement his94
torically has been the basis of admission to federal district courts.

The second requirement is based on the recommendation of the Devitt
Committee, the Wilkey proposal and local rules in force in federal district
courts in Florida, Iowa and Texas. The examination does not test knowledge
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Code of Professional
Responsibility, but does test knowledge of venue as well as knowledge of
federal jurisdiction. An examination requirement may be more readily accepted if a lawyer is permitted to practice law in all federal district courts.
The test should be offered at least twice yearly, preferably at the same

time as the bar examination. Law students from ABA-accredited law schools
should be permitted to satisfy this requirement before graduation and after

93. See Hicks v. Committee on Admissions to Practice in U. S. Dist. Court for E. Dist.
of Tenn., 439 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). Counsel was admitted to the Bar of the
State of Tennessee but was not formally admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. The district court restricted admission to attorneys admitted to practice before the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, and thus Hicks was ineligible to practice before the district court.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recently upheld the Eastern District of Louisiana's rule restricting
admission to attorneys either residing or maintaining an office in Louisiana. Frazier v. Heebe,
788 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475).
Frazier was permitted, as a member of the bar of the State of Louisiana, to practice in all
state courts. See id. at 1051 n.l. Frazier's home and office in Mississippi were conceded to be
closer to the courthouse than the residences and offices of members of the bar of the Eastern
District. Id. at 1054 n.6. However, the belief held by the clerk, two magistrates and two judges
that non-residents in general caused more "problems" than Louisiana lawyers permitted the
court to uphold this rule as to Frazier. Id. at 1054. The dissent reviewed the testimony of the
clerk, magistrates and judges, and found it insular and provincial, and hardly telling of problems
with out-of-state lawyers or with Frazier. Id. at 1058. The dissent concluded that the residence
or office rule upheld by the majority was not based on evidence that the rule furthered the
administration of justice or on evidence that Frazier would not comply with its procedural
rules, but on a feeling that the rules are a good idea since they have long existed. Id. at 1056.
The dissent stated that "the challenged rules are indeed unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of these rules. 107 S.
Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475).
These are the kind of irrational rules that must be eliminated. There is no indication that
Hicks's or Frazier's competence was at issue. These district court rules simply make no sense.
94. See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (lawyer admitted into a
federal court by way of state court); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 442 (1979) ("Since the founding
of the Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States
and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions").
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sixty hours of study, in order to permit students enough time to prepare for
the state bar examination. Sixty hours is approximately two full years of
law school, by which time most students will have had the opportunity to
study the subjects to be examined. Graduates of unaccredited law schools
also should be permitted to take this examination, since graduates of those
schools are eligible to take bar examinations in several states. 95 A distinction

is made between students at accredited law schools and students at unaccredited law schools based on the ascribed proposition that the former are
generally better qualified to prepare for and pass this examination.
The examination may be taken as many times as necessary, in accordance

with the bar examination policy of a number of states.9 Previous failures
should not preclude an applicant from taking the test again because this

examination is not intended to exclude lawyers from practicing in federal
district courts, but rather is intended to ensure a minimal level of compe97
tence.
The eligibility section is not conditioned upon such requirements as residence, a waiting period, previous trial experience, affadavits of good moral
character, an office in any state, or an active practice.
1. Residence
Since the Piper9 s decision, a federal district court requirement of state or

United States residence will not likely withstand a constitutional challenge. 99
In the case of In re Griffiths,1°° the Supreme Court held violative of the

95. See 1984 Bar Examination Statistics, 54 B. EXAMINER 23, 23-25 (1985) (listing by state
the number of graduates of unaccredited law schools passing the bar examination).
96. See, e.g., D. C. Cm. R. 4-1(b)(14) (1984) of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar.
97. But see S.D. FLA. R. 2B.I (examination given six times a year, but applicant may take
it only three times a year and must wait one full year to retake the examination after failing
three times).
98. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985). See supra note I and accompanying text.
99. See Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Colo. 1983), in which the court
stated:
At first glance, these [privileges and immunities] clauses would appear to have no
bearing upon federal action, such as rulemaking by the federal courts. Yet it would
seem anomalous to hold that the federal government may abridge privileges and
immunities of federal citizenship whereas the states may not. Federal privileges and
immunities should, therefore, find protection in other constitutional language.
Id. at 1206 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Contra Frazier v. Heebe,
788 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475)
("privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, § 2, cl. I . . . does not apply to the federal
government and its officers").
However, Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate commerce under article I, §
8, cl. 3, and could likewise repeal 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1984), which authorizes the federal courts
to regulate admission to its bar, and among other things, to enact a statute that limits federal
bar admission. It is unclear whether such a statute would be held constitutional.
100. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment a state bar admission
restriction barring aliens.101 Since the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been determined to contain an equal protection component, 02 a
federal law requirement of state or United States residence may not survive
1
a constitutional attack. 03
In any event, a residence requirement is unnecessary. Most practicing
federal district court litigators will likely reside in the United States, if only
to be visible to their clients. Those living outside the United States, especially
those practicing in foreign offices of United States law firms, are not thereby
shown to be incompetent. As a matter of policy, the client's choice of
counsel should not be abrogated based on a court's disapproval of a lawyer's
choice of residence.
2.

Waiting Period

The Western District of Texas and the District of South Carolina require
applicants to be admitted to practice by a state one and three years, respectively, before becoming eligible for admission to the federal bar."°4 A waiting
period in order to "season" an attorney is an out-dated concept. Graduates
of law schools are sufficiently well-trained to make this requirement obsolete,
and passing the proposed examination confirms the value of their education.
The federal rules of procedure and evidence are taught at most law schools,
either as model rules or as adopted by states. Many bar examinations test
at least some of these subjects. One year of experience as a lawyer does not
indicate that the lawyer has learned more about federal procedure. A threeyear waiting period indicates less knowledge of federal procedure than at
graduation due to a lack of experience practicing in federal court. Further,
lawyers who decide to open their own practices immediately after law school
will be competitively disadvantaged by such a requirement.
3.

Previous Trial Experience

Previous trial experience does not aid in ensuring lawyer competence and
hinders the attorney-client relationship. 0 Such a requirement represents both

101. Id. at 722.
102. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (equal protection analysis in fifth amendment
area same under fourteenth amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (same).
103. State residency is not a suspect classification. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371, 389-91 (1977). Therefore, the statute need only be rationally related to a
governmental interest in order to survive an attack on equal protection grounds. This author
argues that a federal bar admission residency requirement is not rationally related to the interest
of insuring the competence of practicing attorneys. Local rules are available from private
publishing companies and the Administrative Office of the United States Court. See FED. R.
CIv. P. 83. Indeed, this is precisely at issue before the Supreme Court in Frazier v. Heebe, 788
F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454 (Nov. 17, 1986) (No. 86-475).
104. W.D. TEX. R. 200-1(a); D.S.C. IN THE MATTER OF ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINE OF
ATTORNEYS.

105. See supra notes 60-61 & 77-82 and accompanying text.
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a failure to trust the ethics of lawyers and a disregard for the intelligence
of the client. The use of a "barrister" also evidences a disregard for the
sensitive nature of the attorney-client relationship and necessitates a substantial increase in attorney fees. 1°6
4.

Affidavits of Good Moral Character

Many district courts require an attorney to submit affidavits affirming the
applicant's good character as a requirement of admission to the bar. 107 This
requirement is unnecessary because the proposed Rule requires a state license
to become a member of the United States District Bar, and most states
conduct character reviews when initially admitting lawyers to practice. Affidavits from hand-picked friends guarantee that the applicant will satisfy
the state requirement. A requirement that the applicant file affidavits from

one or more members of the federal district court to which the applicant is
applying unduly burdens the applicant's mobility. 08 An applicant may not

be acquainted with any lawyers in the district to which admission is requested.
Thus, the lawyer's application may be denied for reasons unrelated to the

lawyer's competence or the court's interest in having ethical and competent
lawyers practice before it. The federal court cannot always judge the value
of the affidavit. In fact, many federal district courts traditionally rely on
state character examinations in admitting lawyers to practice in federal district
court."' 9 This reliance has not resulted in the admission to practice law of

an abnormal number of incompetent or unethical lawyers.
5.

Office

With the advent of regular transcontinental flights and hearings by conference call, there is no need for an office requirement."l 0 An office require-

106. Attorney fees are the subject of intense debate. See, e.g., LEGAL TiMEs, July 29, 1985,
at 1, col. 3, and at 6, cols. 1-4 (reporting proposal by insurance companies to place cap on
legal fees).
107. See C.D. CAL. R. 2.1.1(d).
108. If necessary, some courts will waive this requirement. D. MD. R. 21.A.2. Moreover,
the requirement may implicate the applicant's constitutional right to travel. Rules that limit the
right to travel have been struck down as unconstitutional. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1960) (state residency requirement for eligibility for welfare benefits unconstitutionally
limits right to travel). But see Wilson v. Wilson, 430 U.S. 925 (1977), summarily aff'g, 416 F.
Supp. 984 (D. Ore. 1976) (state can require bar applicant to express an intent to become resident
at time of admission without violating right of interstate travel).
109. See In re Braverman, 549 F.2d 913, 921 (4th Cir. 1976) (reliance placed on prior
admission to bar of state supreme court) (quoting In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1958)).
See also Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
in In re Discipline of Ashton, 768 F.2d 74, 81, reh'g en banc denied, 769 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.
1985), concluded that a primafacie showing of present good moral and professional character,
in addition to re-admission to practice in state courts, was required for admission to the federal
district court bar for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The circuit court was very critical
of the district court's method of investigating the applicant's character.
110. The increased use by lawyers of computers to aid in the practice of law may also make
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ment discriminates against lawyers practicing outside the ambit of the private
law firm, such as corporate counsel, law professors and attorneys for civil
rights or legal services organizations. The rise in staffing of inside corporate
counsel and the increase in civil rights organizations, especially those that
litigate, necessitates an elimination of the office requirement.
The office requirement is a vestige of an era when attorneys and judges
were intimately familiar with one another, and the practice of law was more
local in scope. This kind of legal community no longer exists, particularly
in federal district courts.
6.

Active Practice

Some courts require a lawyer's practice to be an "active" practice."' This
is perhaps the least defensible federal bar admission requirement. "Active"
is a vague term, easily defined to be as lax or restrictive as the spirit moves.
The court should not be concerned with the state of a lawyer's practice. A
solo practitioner's practice may be active only in the sense that the lawyer
is looking for, and wants to represent, clients. Retired lawyers may want to
handle one particular case. In neither instance is the competence of the
lawyer reflected.
A minimum level of competence is shown by successful completion of
both requirements of section A of the Proposed Rule. A lawyer is ethically
required to handle only those legal matters which the lawyer is capable of
undertaking. A client should be expected to choose a lawyer intelligently.
Admittedly, this Rule only evidences a minimum level of competence and
requires that courts trust both lawyers to act ethically and litigants to make
an informed decision concerning their counsel. The court should permit
litigants to make up their own minds in selecting lawyers to litigate claims
in federal district court.
B.

Admission

An applicant shall file with the Judicial Conference of the United States
an application for admission evidencing eligibility to the Bar of the United
States District Court. Upon admission to the Bar of the United States
District Court, the applicant shall pay a fee (of $100) (prescribed by rule).

the traditional office obsolete or at least irrelevant. It should also be noted that ethical problems
may exist in the use of computers to communicate across state lines, since this may constitute
the unauthorized practice of law. A recent American Bar Association committee has focused
on this and other similar problems. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYERS ON LINE: ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE USE OF TELECOMPUTER COMMUNICATION (1986).

111. See D.R.I. R. 4(b). See also In re Stormont, 238 Kan. .627, 712 P.2d 1279 (1986)
(denying petitioner's application for admission to the bar pursuant to reciprocity rules since he
had failed to actively practice law on full-time basis for five years preceding application).
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This section merely sets forth the mechanics of being admitted to practice
before federal district courts. A one-time administrative fee of one hundred
dollars may be determined to be an incorrect fee to be charged an applicant.
An open alternative is thus included.
C. Representation
Any member of the Bar of the United States District Court shall be
permitted to fully and completely represent any party or intervenor or
amicus curiae in any action pending or instituted in any United States
District Court.
This section provides that admission to practice permits the lawyer to
represent a client in any federal district court without utilizing "local"
counsel. This representation is not limited to any particular kind of litigation
and specifically includes diversity litigation as well as federal-question liti12
gation.
D. Discipline
Any member of the Bar of the United States District Court shall be subject
to suspension or disbarment from the Bar when it is shown that the
member has been suspended or disbarred from practice in any other court
of record or by any other bar or has engaged in conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar in any United States District Court. The member shall
be afforded an opportunity to be heard why the member should not be
suspended or disbarred. Any United States District Court before which a
member is practicing may take appropriate disciplinary action against a
member after a hearing upon good cause.
This section specifically restates the authority of district courts to discipline
attorneys practicing before it."' The section also permits each federal district
court, consonant with due process guarantees, to conduct hearings and
determine the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from the Bar. The courts
have the authority to suspend or disbar any lawyer who has been suspended
or disbarred from any court, or who has been disciplined by a state bar or
other disciplinary authority as a result of unethical "office" practice; In
conjunction with sections E and F, below, section D gives individual district

112. See supra note 35.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1984) (grants federal courts authority to prescribe rules governing
conduct of court's business). See also In re Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 2874, 2880 (1985) (courts have
long recognized inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers) (citing Ex parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1867), and Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824));
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 565-68 (3d Cir. 1985) (courts have authority to
discipline attorneys); Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (D. Colo. 1983) (federal
courts exercise inherent judicial power to regulate admission, practice and discipline of attorneys).
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courts significant authority to ensure ethical practice, because suspension or
disbarment would be effective with respect to practice before any United
States District Court.
E. Nonmember Practice
A lawyer not admitted as a member of the Bar of the United States District
Court shall not be permitted to practice before any United States District
Court except upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, or as permitted
in Section F, below. The non-member attorney shall be permitted to
practice only in a particular case and only in the United States District
Court before which the lawyer petitions to practice under this Section.
Any lawyer so admitted shall be subject to all disciplinary authority of
the United States District Court before which the lawyer is practicing.
The general rule is that a nonmember cannot practice in any federal district
court. The reason is that the showing of a minimum level of competence
has not yet been made. An exception is made for nonmembers to practice
in a particular case before a particular court, but pro hac vice admission is
not to be encouraged. This special admission provision permits the courts
the opportunity to balance its interest in ensuring that the lawyer has attained
a minimum level of competence with the interest of the client in being
represented by a chosen attorney. Since the admission process proposed by
the Rule is not designed to be exclusive, competent lawyers should not have
to resort to this provision.
F.

Grandfather Clause

A lawyer may continue to practice before any United States District Court
to which the lawyer is admitted at the time of adoption of this Rule
without complying with the provisions of Section A, above. Lawyers
practicing under this section shall be subject to the disciplinary authority
of the United States District Court(s) before which the lawyer is permitted
to practice.
The grandfather clause permits a lawyer generally admitted to practice
before one or more federal district courts at the time the Rule is made
effective to continue practicing before those courts. It is likely that the
competence of the lawyer has been assured, and the administrative costs
outweigh the benefits in retesting those lawyers. However, practice is limited
to those courts to which the lawyer has already been admitted. If the lawyer
wishes to practice in a district court to which the lawyer is not admitted,
the lawyer must comply with the provisions of section A, or, in the exceptional case, section E. This limitation of practice is an attempt to strike a
balance between the special benefit afforded to those lawyers already admitted with the cost of providing a second check on the competence of
lawyers who wish to "widen" or expand their practice.

674

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:649

CONCLUSION

Federal district courts have promulgated numerous and various rules that
restrict the admission of lawyers to practice based on antiquated notions of
the practice of law. Most of these rules are not legitimate tests of lawyer
competence. The increased mobility of lawyers and the increase in the
interstate practice of law in the United States requires the implementation
of a modern, uniform rule. The Rule proposed in this Article simplifies the
admission process and is based on the ethical practice of law by lawyers and
on the competent, informed decision-making of clients who are involved in
litigation. The Rule places a premium on trust in lawyers and the marketplace. A single rule providing for the admission of lawyers to practice law
before all federal district courts should have been adopted over a decade
ago, and thus, this Rule should be implemented as soon as possible.

